The Military
Interruption
It happened again! This was not
the first time that normal life was interrupted through abrupt radio
announcements by intruders who force their way into studios and grab the
microphone from frightened official announcers: “Fellow countrymen and women, I
Major (Colonel or Brigadier) so and so, on behalf of the Nigerian Armed Forces,
bla, bla, bla”! It first started on Saturday, January 15, 1966, when Major
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzegwu, after he and his accomplices had murdered our civilian
and military leaders, announced the forceful take over of power, from the
democratically elected governments, for what later turned out to be spurious
reasons. Similarly, subsequent coup-leaders, Ironsi, Gowon, Joe Garba, Murtala
Mohammed, and Bukar Dimka, variously interrupted the status quo and each, after
having overthrown his own military superiors, started to proffer reasons and/or
excuses for snatching political power from his victims. In almost each case,
the gullible Nigerian public accepted the reasons announced and sometimes even
cheered the new corners only to turn round sooner than later to start
complaining and ardently praying for another change of government. This was our
Nigeria of turbulence and instability; a country blessed with great resources
and potentialities yet Marred by what looks like a spell of ethnic rivalries
and highly politicized over ambitious Armed Forces. Since January 1966, most of
the senior members of the Nigeria Armed Forces have been more concerned and
more heavily engaged in the business of coup-planning, and/or running
governments than in the task of protecting the territorial integrity of the
country. Even the civil war in which they fought so gallantly to keep Nigeria
one was itself the direct result of the infighting between power-seeking coup
and counter-coup leaders. The cost to Nigeria is incalculable, considering
among others the number of valuable lives lost and the talents and skills
wasted in the process of incessant changes in the command structure within the
military as well as among the civilians. Nevertheless, the decision of the
Murtala/Obasanjo regime to voluntarily hand over power to civilians was in
itself wise, honourable and magnanimous. It would have been a more lasting
credit to the Nigerian military if by so doing they resolved never to return to
what in fact was not their legimiate role. But it is naive to imagine that
anyone had any control over the ambitious members of the armed forces,
especially those among them who had already tasted power as rulers. Thus from
the time of the military handover to civilians in October 1979 to the present,
there always have been some over-ambitious military men lurking around
somewhere planning a possible take over of government. Our security service,
during the period of my tenure, did a wonderful job of employing quite
efficient methods, through their intelligence, to track down conspiracies
against my administration in their very early stages before they were hatched.
It was only during the latter part of my first term and the beginning of the
second term that the military intelligence became suspect. It was a rather
delicate situation since there was yet no visible evidence of any signs of
disloyalty on the part of the military intelligence. All we had to do was to
keep a close watch and be on our guard until some clear indication appeared,
otherwise we feared, precipitate action might rock the boat in the process.
Worse still, there appeared to be a cleavage within the army hierarchy itself
when some senior officers started quarrelling among themselves for positions.
Some of these senior officers were known to be in league with some influential
politicians from within and outside the administration. Consequently, these
power-hungry officers and messy Politicians quickly factionalized the army into
groups of loyalists and the suspects. Some of my opponents, notably Waziri
Ibrahim, engaged themselves in dangerous past time of what one may call
coup-baiting. Surprisingly, Chief Awolowo did not in any way have any
connection with military during this time, although some of his supporters
could not be absolved. I have on several occasions had the rather unpleasant
duty of personally warning all concerned individually to steer clear of the
dangerous game. As was to be expected, everyone approached on the subject
emphatically denied the charge, but pointed fingers at others. It was a rather
tricky situation which did place me in a kind of dilemma. However, the single
exception to the rule was Alhaji Umaru Dikko, the Minister of Transport, who openly
confessed to me about his involvement in barrack politics. This arose from a
complaint I received in 1983 from some military top-brass who alleged that
Umaru Dikko had been spying at them in their houses and was keeping
surveillance on their movements. When I confronted Umaru on the allegation, he
did not deny the charges but argued that he was doing so in the national
interest and according to him, in order to safeguard my own personal security,
his own and that of my immediate lieutenants whose lives, he believed, were
being threatened by coup-plotters. I quickly dismissed his assertions as
unfounded and told him, in no uncertain terms, to stop meddling in what was
strictly outside his own competence. He dutifully but grudgingly obeyed. Prior
to this incident, a senior army officer who had just returned from a course
abroad came to lodge a complaint to me when his posting was suddenly changed
from the Lagos Garrison, Ikeja Cantonment, to another Command because of what
he believed to be political interference in the matter of military postings. He
heard rumours, he added, that the change in his posting was prompted by alleged
misgiving in his loyalty to the administration. If this were so, he suggested
that he would rather resign from the service and go home. Actually, I did not
know anything at all about his posting and re-posting, and I told him so. I
also assured him of my absolute confidence in him and tried to disabuse his
mind about nursing any grievances based upon unfounded rumours and wild allegations.
We parted with a warm handshake and renewed friendship. Soon afterwards, I
enquired about this issue with the Chief of Army Staff who confessed to me that
he had effected the change of posting, of the particular officer, at the
instance of Umaru Dikko who thought that it would be risky to allow such an
officer to be so close to the seat of power when he was strongly being
suspected of wanting power for himself. I warned the Chief of Army Staff to
desist from doing things behind my back and I asserted that matters such as
this ought not to have escaped my early attention. He however confirmed the
loyalty of the officer concerned, but advised that the new posting should
remain as arranged for administrative convenience. I agreed. Ironically, it was
this same officer who later became the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces and allegedly ordered, among other things, the abortive
forceful repatriation of Umaru Dikko from the United Kingdom through abduction
in a crate! Throughout 1983, the aura of suspicions had prevailed among the
members of the armed forces, and the government found it difficult to ascertain
the loyalty of officers since rumours and mutual suspicions were rife. There
were also allegations of involvement of some retired Army Officers, including
the former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, in coup-baiting, but these
could not be confirmed with any degree of accuracy, except that there were
reported visits by some army officers to Otta Farm which was not unusual. However,
some public statements by General Obasanjo severely criticising the
administration seemed to point to at least a tacit incitement of the military
against the government. I had for long wanted to invite General Obasanjo for
discussion on the current situation, especially on the national economy about
which he showed some concern, but I had observed that he did not like the idea
of visiting the State House since he left it on October 1, 1979. For example,
he never agreed to grace my usual luncheon at the State House, Marina, with
members of the National Council of States (of which he was a member), after
each sitting of that council. I therefore resorted to sending my emmisaries to
Otta Farm to convey my respects and bring back any advice he might wish to
offer. I knew that Alhaji Shehu Musa, the Secretary of the Government, was his
personal friend and he, among others, occasionally visited the General at my
behest. Yet for some strange reasons this soldier-statesman had developed some
kind of deep malevolence for me, despite the very high regard and respect I
have always had for him, as was demonstrated by the highest national honour I
awarded him and which I still believe he richly deserved. I understand from
someone close to him, however, that he had expected me to be constantly
consulting him on all matters of government since he had an obsession of being
a super-administrator, super-diplomat and of course a military genius. With all
due deference, however, I believe that as a politician who had been in
government for a much longer time than he, I would have very little to learn
from a leader who had never in his life time had the privilege and the burden
of even participating in a democratic government. Running a democratic
government is quite a different problem from running a military dictatorship.
General Obasanjo would appear to have failed to appreciate this simple fact. As
a matter of fact, I observed as early as September 1979, that General Obasanjo
had taken me for a novice who, according to his book; Not my Will,” was pushed
into power by those who wanted to make use of him and was unfortunately too
weak and somewhat ill-prepared for the trappings of political power to check
the abuse of his power by those who made use of him”. It is true that I “did
not court power and wanted to be nothing more than a Senator” but I am proud to
have been “pushed” by millions of Nigerian voters (with 25 per cent of the
total votes cast in thirteen states) while General Obasanjo was pushed by only
a handful of military officers in the Supreme Military Council after the fall
of General Murtala Mohammed in February 1976 when he reluctantly accepted the
offer, even though he was definitely ill-prepared for “the trappings of
political power”. It is doubtful however, whether in fact he was strong enough,
as he implied in his book, “to check the abuses of his power” by those who made
him what he was. As for me, I was without doubt more than adequately prepared
and equipped for the job and knew exactly the scope as well as the limitations
of presidential powers in a democratic system. Conversely, it is indeed the
military rulers who were, in almost all cases, ill-prepared for the trappings
of political power when they took over from civilians simply because the
business of coup-planning and execution does not easily give much room for
political programming. A military junta normally starts thinking of how to
govern after their secret plans to take over power have been successfully
executed; and even then they have to desperately look for assistance and
counsel from civilians. At least that has been the Nigerian experience. But
General Obasanjo had himself admitted that he was not even a member of the
junta which took over power; others grabbed the power and simply pushed him
into it for reasons best known to them. In contrast, civilian chief executives
can never be imposed on the voters by any group of persons however hard they
may try, because voters are not fools. Despite our political differences, I
respect my opponents more than any military ruler for the simple reason that
each one of them had respect for and indeed loyalty to the Nigerian
Constitution and was guided in all his actions by the constitution and the
programme of his party, which he tried hard to sell to the electorate. In other
words, he was working under a democratic system and was therefore answerable to
the people. In contrast, the first action of any successful coup-maker was to
suspend the constitution and thereafter replace the laws of the land with decrees
and edicts. The politicians were consequently grounded and in the end everyone
of them, including the members of the opposition, automatically became the
loser. Regrettably, it turned out after the 1983 elections that some of my
opponents did not see things in that light. First, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, out
of frustration, declared that democracy was dead in Nigeria and decided not to
go to court this time. However, acts of arson and murder of his opponents
became rampant in his former stronghold when his party was defeated at the
polls. Then there was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Owelle of Onitsha and
presidential candidate of NPP who, after suffering defeat for the second time,
decided not to weep this time. Instead, he shouted hoarse and promised fire and
brimstone to his opponents. He swore and cursed when he and his henchman, Jim
Nwobodo, were rejected at the polls in their own strongholds. The entire news
media under the control of these leaders was directed towards running down my
administration and recklessly pouring out venom and vitriol to every action of
government on day to day basis to the extent of courting military intervention.
Indeed, this was exactly the kind of situation that coup-planners eagerly
waited for. Rumours about probable military intervention were rampant and our
security outfit became strained as professional rumormongers and crooks started
to cash in on the situation. One instance of the series of coup-scares in this
period is perhaps worthy of mention. In March 1982 I accepted an invitation
from the Government of West Germany to pay an official visit to West Germany in
reciprocation of an earlier visit by the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to
Nigeria. Only two days before my departure, an official delegation consisting
of a Minister and a Chief of National Security arrived from Togo with a message
from President Eyadema advising me very strongly to postpone my impending visit
to Germany because he had received information from what he called reliable
sources about a coup d’etat planned against my government during my absence
from Nigeria. His informant was a German national who claimed that he
personally had participated in drawing the plan for a military coup to be
executed first in Nigeria, then in Togo and finally in Ivory Coast. President
Eyadema then proposed a meeting of the three Heads of State concerned to
discuss the issue at a time and place to be determined later. He further
suggested that I should meet the German informant as soon as possible for
further elaboration and explanation and that if I agreed he could send him
along to me any time. I thanked the President for his concern and the kind
advice offered, but regretted that I could not at that late stage postpone my
visit to Germany as it would be extremely difficult for me to explain away the
postponement. Accordingly, I asked the President to kindly arrange for the
German informant to meet me in Germany during the period of my visit. On
arrival in Germany, I had a private discussion with the German Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt in which I asked for his assistance in tracing for me the credentials
of the German informant and if possible the credibility of his assertions. The
Chancellor obliged and passed over the name of the informant (which I gave to
him) to an official who, within minutes, produced before us a complete profile
of the subject obtained from a computer which revealed among other things that
our informant was a German ex-serviceman, a mercenary and an international
crook who had successfully duped a member of foreign Heads of States and
Governments as well as some diplomats and businessmen. Consequently, I did not
see the informant after all, but I asked my officials to see him and tell him
off. I Immediately reciprocated the friendly gesture of President Eyadema by
sending to him one of my ministers who proceeded to Togo from Germany in order
to brief him on our findings. The regime of coup-scare also extended to
disinformation device which some foreign governments deliberately
fabricate with the intent to cleverly influence our foreign policy to
their advantage. One such instance may be worthy of mention. The Head of State
of an African country defied protocol by choosing to send our own ambassador
accredited to his country to deliver a personal message to me instead of
sending his own ambassador in Nigeria or a special envoy. The ambassador was
told to bye-pass the Ministry of External Affairs and deliver this secret
message directly to me, which he did. The message contained some documents
purported to have been stolen from the Libyan Embassy in Lagos by some foreign
intelligence agents. The documents appeared authentic as they were written in
Arabic on the Embassy’s letter headings with the Libyan crest imprinted on them
and with signatures. Some were decoded messages received through the telex.
There was an English translation already provided by the sender which revealed
some correspondence on the subject of a planned coup against my government to
be sponsored by Libya. It contained names of Nigerian military and civilian
collaborators and other details including a schedule of my own movements. The
sender advised me very strongly to be on my guard and promised to keep me
posted whenever his own informants (which curiously enough were the government
of another country outside Africa) were able to fish out more information on
the matter. In consultation with our own intelligence unit, I discovered that
the documents submitted to me were indeed fake and the information contained in
it were not credible at all. Besides, it was rather strange that the original
source of this information chose to pass it to someone else outside Nigeria
instead of passing it directly. The motive was clear, that is, to soil the good
relationships then developing between Nigeria and Libya, especially after
Colonel Ghadaffi’s successful state visit to Nigeria, in 1983, and to make the
sender appear as the best friend of Nigeria. This clever device in
international politics is popularly known as disinformation. There were many
such incidents during my term of office, especially during the second term, but
thanks to the vigilance and efficiency of our national security service, each
case was carefully analysed and exposed. It was not, however, to be assumed
that all the stories and reports received about suspected coup-plots were
unreliable or untrue. There were certainly some which were found to have
elements of truth and these were promptly investigated and subsequently
suppressed or nipped in the bud. One such example may be worthy of mention. In
one of his usual address at the parade ground in Ikeja Cantonment, the then
Commander of the Brigade of Guards, advised the troops under his command to
beware of conspirators and coup-plotters. He instructed them to report
immediately to authorities anyone who approached them on the subject of coup.
Failure to report such overtures from any quarters, he warned, would, when
found, attract the same punishment as that of the plotters themselves. Upon
this, a soldier walked into the office of the commander immediately after the
parade and informed him that some time ago, some of his colleagues approached
him and took him to see one Alhaji Bukar Mandara at his house in Idi-Araba,
Lagos, to discuss the possibility of participation in a coup but he refused to
have anything to do with it, and he was reporting in obedience to the advice of
his commander. Bukar Mandara was for many years the contractor supplying food
to the Brigade of Guards, Lagos, and he became aggrieved when he lost his
contract in 1979 after the civilians took over. He used his acquaintances in
the Brigade to organize a coup to topple my government. Investigations based on
this report confirmed the coup-plot and the suspects including Bukar Mandara
were arraigned before the court. The last attempt at coup-plotting came just
after the close of the Mandara case. A Lieutenant-Colonel was detected while he
was moving into Army locations in the country, and allegedly soliciting for the
support of selected army officers in a bid to change the government by force.
The colonel was accordingly arrested and interrogated by the military
authorities. However, the National Security Organization had reason to suspect
that the military intelligence were dragging their feet in the investigation
and pressed for a more serious handling of the case. I therefore directed the
National Security Organization (NSO) to take over the investigation and report
back with despatch. The NSO thereon took custody of the suspect and started
their investigations in earnest. It was while they were doing this that the
coup plotters struck!
Read More at:
https://leadership.ng/2018/12/30/the-military-interruption/
